The Buenos Aires water concession by Alcazar, Lorena et al.
OPS -23/1
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2311
The Buenos  Aires  Water  Transparent,  rule-based
decisionmaking  is important
Concession  to maintaining  public  trust  in
regulated  infrastructure.  The
Buenos  Aires  water  and
Lorena  Alca'zar
sanitation  concession  led to
Manuel  A. Abdala
remarkable  improvements  in
Mary M. Shirley  delivery  and coverage  of
services  and to lower  prices
for consumers.  But  a poor
information  base,  lack  of
transparency  in regulatory
decisions,  and  the ad hoc
nature  of  executive  branch
interventions  make  it difficult
to reassure  consumers  that
their  welfare  is  being
protected  and that  the
concession  is  sustainable.
The World Bank
Development Research  Group

















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2311
Summary findings
The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires  charges. And these improvements would probably not
water and sanitation system in December 1992 attracted  have occurred under public administration of the system.
worldwide attention and caused considerable controversy  Still, as Alcazar, Abdala, and Shirley show, information
in Argentina.  asymmetries, perverse incentives, and weak regulatory
It was one of the world's  largest concessions, but the  institutions could threaten  the concession's sustainability.
case was also interesting for other reasons. The  Opportunities  for the company to act opportunistically
concession was implemented rapidly, in contrast with  - and the regulator, arbitrarily - exist because of
slow implementation of privatization in Santiago, for  politicized regulation, a poor information base, serious
example. And reform generated major improvements in  flaws in the concession contract, a lumpy and ad hoc
the sector, including wider coverage, better service, more  tariff system, and a general lack of transparency in the
efficient company operations, and reduced waste.  regulatory process.
Moreover, the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9  Because of these circumstances, public confidence in
percent reduction in water system tariffs.  the process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession
Consumers benefited from the system's expansion and  shows how important transparent, rule-based
from the immediate drop in real prices, which was only  decisionmaking is to maintaining public trust in regulated
partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs and access  infrastructure.
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iiI.  INTRODUCTION
The signing of a concession contract for the Buenos Aires water and sanitation
system in December 1992 has attracted world wide attention and been the subject of
considerable controversy in Argentina (see for example, Idelovitch 1994, The Economist
various, Artana et. al 1997). In addition to being one of the world's largest concessions,
the case is interesting for a number of other reasons. First, the rapid implementation of
the Buenos Aires concession is in contrast to the slow moves towards private
participation in other water systems, such as Santiago or Lima.  We explore in Section II
the circumstances in the water sector and the political and institutional factors that led
Argentina to implement the concession. Second, the reform has been widely acclaimed
for generating major improvements in the sector, including wider coverage, better
service, more efficient operation of the company, and a reduction in waste.  What makes
these improvements especially striking is that the winning bid brought an immediate 26.9
percent reduction in water system tariffs.'  We explore the features of the contract that
explain performance improvements, and consider how institutions affected outcomes in
Section III.  Finally, the Buenos Aires case is of interest because the contract was
renegotiated in 1997, provoking criticisms of the original bid and the regulation. We
describe these revisions in Section IV and measure the extent to which Buenos Aires was
better off because of ithe  concession, with and without the renegotiation, in Section V.
Section VI concludes with lessons for reform design.
As we will show, water and sewerage services improved dramatically thanks to
the concession.  Consumers benefited from the large drop in real prices, which was only
'This  decrease was subsequently eroded, as we explain later.2
partly reversed by subsequent changes in tariffs and access charges, and from a large
expansion of the system.  Quality and reliability of service also improved, and wastage of
water was reduced.  We will argue that these improvements would not have occurred
under any reasonable assumptions about continued public operation of the water system.
These gains notwithstanding, we will demonstrate how information asymmetries,
perverse incentives and weak regulatory institutions could threaten the long-run
sustainability of the concession. In particular, politicization of the regulator, a poor
information base, serious flaws in the concession contract, an obscure tariff system and a
general lack of transparency in the regulatory process, have created opportunities for the
company to act opportunistically, and the regulator, arbitrarily. These circumstances
have led the federal executive to by-pass the regulator, and public confidence in the
process has eroded. The Buenos Aires concession shows the importance of transparent,
rule-based decision making in maintaining public trust in regulated infrastructure.
II.  CIRCUMSTANCES  LEADING TO REFORM
A.  Circumstances in the Water Sector
Reform is more likely to occur when the water sector is in crisis, but only if the
causes of the crisis are tractable (Alcazar and Brook Cowen 1996). Problems that result
from a failure to expand supply as fast as demand or from mismanagement are easier to
address than those that stem from scarce and costly raw water. Buenos Aires did not
have a public health crisis, but it did have serious problems. We argue in this sect  ion that
it was ripe for reform because its sector problems were highly tractable, given the right
political circumstances.3
(i) Cost and Scarcity of Raw Water. Buenos Aires sits on the west bank of the
Rio de la Plata, which has an abundant flow of 29,000 M3 per second (World Bank 1994)
and supplies 92 percenLt  of the system's water needs. 2 As a result the supply of raw water
is ample throughout the year and transport costs are low. Nasser 1997 estimated that the
marginal cost of water in Buenos Aires could be as low as US$0.15 per cubic meter, even
taking into account the investments being implemented under the concession. This is -
cheap compared to cities with scarce water supplies, such as Lima, where the marginal
cost of water and sewerage was estimated at US$0.45 per M3 in 1994 (World Bank
1994).
(ii) Supply and Demand  Notwithstanding the ample availability of cheap raw
water, before the concession only 70 percent of the population in the metropolitan area
were connected to the water system, and only 58 percent to the sewerage system. The
shortfall was in the poorer, suburban areas, which had been growing by 5 to 6 percent a
year prior to the concession and totaled 5.6 million people at the time it was signed in
December 1992. 3  Only 55 percent of persons in these areas had access to water and only
36 percent to sewerage. Almost all of the 3 million inhabitants in the older center of the
city, the Capital District, were connected to the municipal system (Table 1 ).
2 The rest is from about  300  wells that are becoming  increasingly  contaminated  by untreated  sewerage.
3 Approximately,  2 million  people  are in  the province  of Buenos  Aires  but are not in  the concession  area.
They  are served  by municipalities.4
Table 1.  Water and Sanitation Coverage before Privatization
Water  Sewerage
Capital  District  99%  990%g)
Suburban areas  55%  360%
Total  metropolitan  area  70%  58°%
Number  of connections  (millions)  1.2  0.7
Source:  Concession  Contract.
The state owned water utility, OSN (Obras Sanitarias de la Naci6n), had not been
investing enough to keep up with the pace of growth in these outlying areas of the city,
and the bulk of new connections had been financed by neighborhood associations.  The
growth of connections was very slow, and below Buenos Aires' low population growth
rate in 1991 (Figure 1). Indeed, OSN's level of investment was not even enough to
maintain existing assets.  For example, average annual investment from 1987 to 1991 was
only US$11  million,  which did not cover depreciation.  Much of the water  and sanitation
system was more than 60 years old and badly in need of repair and replacement at lhe
time of the concession in 1993 (FIEL 1997). The deterioration of the system caused
water shortages in parts of the city during the summer, as well as frequent breaks and
interruptions, low pressure, poor water quality, and sewer flooding during rainstorns.4
Unaccounted for water (UFW), the difference between water production and the volume
billed to customers, calculated as a percent of water produced, reached 45 percent before
the concession, compared to 10 to 20 percent in OECD countries. 5
4 Only 17 percent  of the population  in the suburbs  received  adequate  pressure  before  the concession,
defined  as greater  than 8 wcm (Abdala  1997).
5 UFW represents  losses  due to leaks,  theft,  and failure  to register  users.5
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One reason for OSN's low investment rates was its lack of funds because of its
inefficient operation, combined with declining real low water tariffs. Water tariffs had
declined in real terms during much of the preceding thirty years, falling by almost 70
percent from 1960 to 1976. The Ministry of Economy and Public Works was nominally
responsible for setting prices and investment policy, but in practice pricing decisions
were often influenced by political considerations.
Consumers had little incentive to conserve. Not only were water prices low, but
also nearly 99 percent of consumption was unmetered, billing was based on factors with
little relation to consumption, and only 80 percent of billed values were collected. 6
Besides poor billing and collection because of OSN's failures, the law did not permit the
company to cut service to households who didn't pay.  Water consumption in 1993 was
estimated at 352 liters per capita per day, compared to, for example, 173 in Santiago,
another city with ample raw water. 7
6 Although  20  percent  of customers  had  meters  half  of these  were  inoperative.
7 Based  on water  distributed  divided  by connected  consumers.6
(Wi)  Management.  Besides defects in collection and investment, OSN was
generally mismanaged. The company's auditor cited OSN's poor internal organization
and admiinistration  and unreliable accounting information in its annual reports. The
company was overstaffed with 8 workers per 1000 connections compared to 2 in
Santiago!.  Salaries were low, turnover of skilled personnel, high, and the entire
workforce suffered from low productivity and lack of discipline (Idelovitch 1994 and
FIEL 1]996).
Top management was politically chosen and priorities were set according to non-
commercial criteria. As a result OSN's scarce funds were focused on more visible new
constraction projects rather than maintenance, even though many of these new works
were never completed. In addition, OSN was widely regarded as unresponsive to
customer complaints; at one point the backlog of water breaks awaiting repair was close
to 7,000.
O)SN  lost money in three of the five years leading up to the implementation of the
concession in 1993. It made money in the other years only thanks to inflation accounting
and non-operating income.  Indeed, OSN was not designed to be financially autonomous;
its act cf incorporation provided for the company to make use of Treasury subsidies
whenever its own revenues did not cover its costs (OSN Ley Organica 1949).
Nevertheless, many observers believed that an efficiently operated OSN could hav- made
money and expanded coverage, given the low cost of water in Buenos Aires (field
interviews).  The government had increased prices in the years before the concession, and
s One reason  for this was  that OSN  had once  been  responsible  for water  throughout  Argentina  and  when  the
sector was decentralized  in 1980,  OSN  failed  to reduce  its staffing  pari pasu.7
even though the increases were less than inflation, it became more likely that an
efficiently operated company could earn a reasonable return on capital. 9
(iv) Externalities and Health Problems.  The opportunity cost of water usage in
Buenos Aires was and is low. Usage costs are low because the city's extraction rate,
while relatively high, is far below the river's replenishment rate and drinking water is not
in competition with other uses. Externalities due to pollution of the river have also been
low. Even though only 5 percent of sewage is treated before being dumped in the river,
this contamination has had low external costs thanks to the self purification capacity of
the river and the fact that downstream users are not affected.'0
The principal externality from the system resulted from contamination of
groundwater and rivers by septic tanks, cesspools and direct discharge of untreated
sewerage and industrial effluent. At the time of the concession eighty eight percent of
those not connected to the sewerage system used cesspools and septic tanks and the
remainder used direct disposal such as discharges into creeks. Since 95 percent of the
thirty percent of the population without connection to piped water relied on shallow
wells, waterborne diseases from bacterial contamination were believed to be important
among this population.
Thus, in many ways Buenos Aires' sector circumstances seemed exceptionally
well suited for successful reforn.  Despite an abundant and forgiving source, water had
been made artificially scarce by mismanagement and poor policy, resulting in preventable
9  Water  tariffs were increased  by 25 percent  in  February  1991  and  by 29 percent  in April of 1991.
Although  the CPI increased  by 84 percent  in 1991,  by the time  of the concession  the rate  was sufficient  to
cover OSN's operating  and maintenance  costs.
'° The construction  of a 2.5 km offshore  pipe  at one  of the effluent  plants  (Berazategui)  eliminated
problems  for downstream  users  (Obras  Sanitarias  de Buenos  Aires  near  the city of La  Plata).8
externalities. Of course the fact that problems have a solution doesn't mean they umill  be
solved; that occurs when political and institutional circumstances are favorable, as we
consider next.
B.  Political Circumstances
Our premise is that reform becomes politically desirable when the political
benefits outweigh the political costs, and feasible when reformners  have the power to
overcome opposition and implement change (World Bank 1995). It is credible when the
reforners'  promises are believable and sustainable when those promises are hard to
overtun.  This section explains how water system reform became politically desirable,
politically feasible and credible in Buenos Aires.
(i) Economic Crises Made Reform Feasible. Water reform became politically
feasilble  in Argentina because economic crisis changed the rules of politicatl  competition,
encouraging cooperation after years of bitter conflict. To understand the unique
circumstances that made reform feasible we must understand Argentina's history. Three
political forces vying for power have dominated Argentina's political history since the
early 1940's - the military, members of the Radical Party (mainly the middle class) and
the primarily working class members of the Peronist Party.  These groups failed to
develop stable, cross-cutting coalitions that could bring together different interests to
support policies that would encourage economic growth (McCubbins 1993). Rather,
when one group was in control it used its power to redistribute wealth and income to the
benefit of its supporters, and to reverse the actions of its predecessors (Ibid., Hill and
Abdala, 1993). As a result successive regimes tended to expand the role and employment9
of the state, control prices and salaries, and restrict trade, contributing to deficit public
spending, rising inflationary pressures and falling production.
The frequent intervention of the military and the rise of Peronism contributed to
the instability of Argentine politics. From 1930 to 1983 there were five military coups
that resulted in a total of 23 years of military rule. The rise of Juan Domingo Per6n in the
1940's with his base in urban, unionized labor, led to further instability by polarizing-
politics between the Peronist Party and the opposition Radicals.  During the period when
Peron and, following his death in 1974, his wife, were in power (1946-55 and 1973-
1976), the role of the state in the economy was increased through nationalization of
public services, or direct interventions, such as fixing prices and wages.  Both of these
Perionist regimes were characterized by increasing political polarization and both were
ended by military coup.
The instability and economic deterioration continued under the military
governments that followed. The military regime from 1976 to 1983 focused mainly on
defeating the urban guerrilla movement through increasingly repressive tactics; (during
their rule thousands of citizens disappeared). Although they followed more liberal
economic policies with some initial successes, the conflict with the British over the
Malvinas Islands in 1982 greatly increased the external debt and deficit spending,
contributing to rising inflation that reached 15 percent a month by the end of 1983 (Snow
1996). The economy did not improve with the restoration of democracy and the election
of the candidate of the Radical Party, Rafil Alfonsin.  Continued political polarization
made meaningful structural reforms impossible.  The executive and one house of10
congress were held by the Radical Party while the other house was controPled  by the
Peronists.
By the time of the election of the Peronist candidate, Carlos Menem, in 1989,
Argentina was in the midst of a severe economic crisis.  In the previous five and a half
years real salaries had decreased by 50 percent, unemployment and underemploynment
had cloubled,  annual inflation had increased to more than 3,000 percent and the economy
was in recession (GDP fell by 1.3 percent in real terms). Menem won 47 percent of the
votes and control of the Senate. Although Menem himself was a moderate, he ran on a
traditional Peronist platform that stressed popularism and won the support of most of the
poor.  His Radical opponent's platform, in contrast, called for stabilization and liberal
market reforms, policies that Menem adopted after taking power.
The severity of the economic crisis prompted the moderate wings of the two
major political parties, who represented middle to upper income voters, to build an
infoimTal  coalition in order to bring the Menem government quickly and give it the power
it needed to address the accelerating hyperinflation and economic deterioration. 11 The
moderates supported compromise because of concerns that further deterioration o f the
economy might tempt the military to intervene, as had so often happened before. '[he  low
public support for the traditional parties in opinion polls (Table 2) created further
pressure for consensus.  Accordingly, the moderate wings of the opposing political
parties agreed that Menem could take power five months ahead of schedule to avoid a
" Menem's party officially called the Justicialist Party, included not only the urban wor]king  class,  and the
middle class of poorer provinces, but also newer industrialists. Some of his appointees were menmbers  of
other parties.11
long hiatus between the election and his inauguration. 12 The opposition Radical Party
also agreed to support a series of laws giving the President sweeping powers that, in
effect, allowed him to legitimize frequent use of emergency decrees during the crisis and
early reform period (McCubbins 1993).13 Menem made wide use of this power: while his
predecessor, President Alfonsin, had issued 10 decrees, Menem issued 308 from 1989 to
1993 (de Michele and Mazetti 1996).
(ii) The Menem Administration Strengthened the Chances for Reform. Reform
was also politically feasible because the Menem administration was able to neutralize two
formerly powerful factions that might ordinarily have opposed his free market reforms,
the military and unionized labor. The military had been weakened after its defeat in the
Falklands war with the U.K. and its use of repressive tactics to control guerilla violence
*when  it was in power from 1976 to 1983. This weakness reduced the likelihood of
military intervention, but did not eliminate it. By granting amnesty to low level
participants in insurrections against Alfonsin and pardons to military personnel involved
in some past violations of human rights, President Menem removed a potential source of
tension.
Unionized labor, who were important to the extreme wing of Menen' s own
political party was also much weakened.  Unions' credibility with the public was very
low, as evidenced by polls after Menem's election. The approval rating of unions in
12 Menem  won the election  on May 14, 1989  but would  normally  not take power  until December  10;
instead  he was inaugurated  in July. The CPI  rose by 78%  in May, 114%  in June, 197%  in July,  and 38% in
August. The  exchange  rate  devalued  by about  3,700%  in the five  months  between  the election  and  when
Menem  took  office.
13 Law 23696 gave the executive power to reorganize, privatize or close any public agency or corporation
by decree,  and Law  23697  granted  the executive  power  to modify,  eliminate,  or create  regulation  affect
almost any aspect of business or labor relations. The executive also had strong powers when Congress is
not in session or during exceptional periods according to the Constitution then in force (Michele and
Manzetti 1996).12
Greater Buenos Aires (the Capital District and surrounding suburbs) dropped from
21 percent in February 1989  to 15 percent in June 1990, to 8 percent in November 1990..
Although other groups also received low approval ratings, none were as low as the
unions, see Table 2.  Electoral defeats in later congressional elections brought the rnumber
of union representatives dovn from 35 deputies in 1983 to 8 in 1993. Furtlermore,  since
labor had backed Menem's election, they had few attractive alternatives to which they
could switch support when he enacted policies they opposed.
Table 2. Popular Approval of Certain Groups
Rate of approval of.-'  Feb.  June  Nov.
Rate of approval of:  ________  1989  1990  1990
Military  26%  24%  22%o
Entrepreneurs  38%  32%  31%/'o
Political  parties  31%  23%  14%o
Unions  21%  15%  8%/0
Average  for  greater  Buenos  Aires.
Source: Fundaci6n CEDEPAL,  various.
The Menem administration was thus well situated for enacting radical change.
Althcugh Menem's  platform had not stressed free market reforms, hyperinflation and a
rapidly deteriorating economy demanded a new approach. Furthermore, mrost  people
favorecd  or were at least neutral towards privatization in the first years of his government.
Polls suggest that opposition to privatization in Buenos Aires was only 16 percent in
1989.,  and subsequently averaged about 35 percent between 1990 and the signing of the
water concession in 1993 (Table 3).13
Table 3.  Public Opinion of Privatization*
(percentages)
Opinion  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Positive  (1)  25.5  59.4  38.3  39.0  26.4  36.4  29.9  24.3  16.7  18.1
Neutral  20.6  15.9  24.4  26.5  25.0  25.6  29.2  31.6  27.7  26.9
Negative  (2)  38.6  16.4  34.4  29.3  43.6  33.3  36.2  42.7  52.2  51.9
No opinion  15.4  8.4  3.0  5.3  5.0  4.7  4.7  1.4  3.4  3.1
(1)/(2)  0.7  3.6  1.1  1.3  0.6  1.1  0.8  0.6  0.3  0.3
* Great Buenos  Aires Area
SOURCE: Centro de Estudios Uni6n para la Nueva Mayoria.
Nevertheless, the administration had doubts about whether the political coalition
that made privatization possible was robust or durable.  On the one hand, most politicians
and ordinary citizens, fearing that a failure to go along with change might bring back the
status quo of hyperinflation and decline, were ready to give Menem a long honeymoon
period.  On the other hand, the government was enacting a very ambitious program that
had not been part of its electoral platform. The new administration began in 1990 to
liberalize trade, lay off government employees, curb state spending and privatize state
owned enterprises; then in 1991 it instituted a currency board pegging the peso to the
dollar.'4 Consequently, the government launched privatization with a strong sense of
urgency (field interviews).  Speedy privatization was also seen as key to the success of
the government's economic program since stabilization and fiscal and monetary reforms
depended on privatization bringing new private capital, reducing fiscal hemorrhaging,
shrinking the debt overhang through debt: equity swaps, and endowing the economic
program with greater credibility with investors and debt holders.  This focus on speed
was to have important implications for the water concession, as we discuss in Section IV.
14 Government employment was reduced by 60 percent during the first five years of the administration; 15
percent through layoffs and 85 percent through transfers to jobs in health and education in the provinces.14
(iii)  The Political Desirability of Water System Reform.  From the beginning
private participation in the water system was part of the Menem administration's
privatization program. Argentina's quick action on the Buenos Aires water systemn
concession is in contrast to two of its neighbors, Chile and Peru.  Chile had planned to
sell the assets of Santiago's water system and Peru had planned a concession in Lima,
also as part of large privatization programs.  But both governments treated water
privatization as low priority, delayed the transaction, and, after initially contacting
bidders, ultimately failed to privatize. These delays are not surprising.  Water does not
usually have high saliency in privatization programs, especially a concession, since it
brings no new capital to reward supporters or compensate losers, and since it affects a
single city rather than the nation.  This low saliency helps explain why Chile and Peru
delayed and ultimately dropped their privatization plans, the puzzle is why Argentina
went forward.  We might expect that the different decisions were prompted by a need to
improve the poor performance of the Buenos Aires water company. But bad as OSN
was, things in Lima were much worse (see Alcazar and Xu 1998).
The Buenos Aires concession went forward as part of the block of transactions
because the net political benefits to Menem appeared to be larger than the net benefits
from similar action in Peru to Fujimori or in Chile to Pinochet. In the 1989 election
Menern received solid support from those most adversely affected by the hyperinilation
(lower'  and middle class, salaried workers, self employed and unemployed).  Tharks to
this support, he carried the poorer suburban areas of Buenos Aires, but did poorly in the
upper middle and upper income districts. Coincidentally, the latter were the same
districts that had the highest rates of connection to the water system (Table 4).15
Table 4:  Votes for Menem in the 1989 Presidential Elections Compared to Water
and Sewerage Connections and Income Group
Election returns  Percentage Coverage  Income
%Menem  Water  Sewerage  Group*
Capital District  36.6%  99%  99%
North Zone  69%  44%
Vicente Lopez  29.8%  98%  95%  1 & 3
San Isidro  34.1%  81%  35%  1 & 3
Tigre  53.7%  24%  8%  4& 6
San Fernando  50.3%  64%  24%  4& 6
West Zone  54%  45%
Moron  48.1%  30%  25%  4& 6
La Matanza  60.2%  54%  55%  4& 6
Tres de Febrero  50.8%  69%  57%  1 & 3
San Martin  50.1%  77%  40%  1 & 3
South Zone  49%  21%
Avellaneda  46.7%  83%  37%  1 & 3
Lanus  52.8%  76%  17%  1 & 3
Lomas de Zamora  52.8%  53%  30%  1 & 3
Almirante Brown  60.0%  13%  9%  4& 6
Est. Echeverria  58.6%  10%  8%  4& 6
1  1-3 = upper and upper middle income; 4-6= lower middle and low income.
Sources: Election results: Diario El Clarin, May 16 1989.1ncome  groups: INDEC, "El Consumo y el
Ingreso de Los Hogares Frente a una Caida de la Inflacion".  1985/1986 Water and Sewerage Coverage:
Concession Contract.
Th,e  design of the concession rewarded both supporters and opponents. Middle
and upper income households who were already connected to the water system would
benefit from the concession since the tender was awarded on the basis of the lowest water
tariff, and designed to bring substantial improvements in service.  The suburban poor
were also expected to benefit from increased access, as Table 5 shows. Although the
poor were required to pay much of the cost of the expansion of the secondary network
through a so-called infrastructure charge, the government staff who helped draft the
contract thought that the poor could afford this infrastructure charge since the concession
required the company to provide financing assistance for two years at 12 percent interest
(field interviews). 15 As we shall see, this proved to be a serious sources of problems
'5 The nominal interest rate on debt at the time was over 20 percent.16
later.  WVater  worker opposition to the reform was reduced by the pledge of shares in the
privatized firm. The close involvement of the union officials in the process also helped
win their acquiescence. (The head of the union was part of the privatization committee.)
TPable  5. Projected Socioeconomic Status of Households with New Water
Connections
(first five years of concession)
# of New Connections  Percentages
High/ Middle High  90,200  15.44
Middle Low  282,250  48.31
Low  211,800  36.25
TOTAL  584,250  100
Source: Undersecretariat of Water Resources 1996. Based on actual and projected works.
Thus, in contrast to Santiago and Lima, the political economy of the Buenos Aires
concession appeared to be a win-win decision politically with benefits for core
constituents in the suburbs and potential swing voters in the center.  Both Santiago and
Lima would have had to raise prices substantially to cover their costs, while in Buenos
Aires prices could be reduced through more efficient operation.  Coverage could be
expanded in Buenos Aires without putting much of a burden on existing customers, or so
it seemed at the time of the concession, something that was clearly impossible in Lima.
And the Buenos Aires concession might help the Menem administration's  standing with
important swing constituents, whereas Pinochet had little expectation of improving his
support in Santiago when he faced the plebiscite in 1988, regardless of water reforms.
(iv) Credibility of Water System Reform. Even though the Buenos Aires
concession was politically feasible and desirable, the government's promise to honor its
contractual obligations also had to be credible. Otherwise, potential investors would not17
participate or would demand a large risk premium (Levy and Spiller 1994, World Bank
1995). Investors also had to believe that commitments would be honored by future
governments or they would try to front load their returns and invest less in expanding and
maintaining assets.  Three factors made the Buenos Aires concession agreement appear
credible and a constitutional reform made it more likely that it would be sustained.
Credibility was strengthened first by the fact that by the time the water system-
concession was signed in 1993,  the government had already implemented a market-
oriented reform program and privatized majority ownership of large state enterprises in
telecommunications, electricity, gas and airlines. A total of US$18 billion in federal
assets had been sold by 1993 (Shaikh, 1996) and by 1994, 90 percent of all federal
enterprises had been sold.'6
A second feature which enhanced the concession's credibility was the process of
privatizatilon,  which was designed to build a broad base of support by involving both
houses of Congress, all affected federal ministries, provincial and local governments, and
the staff of the affected SOE. It also built workers' support by pledging to transfer 10
percent of shares in the new water company to them whenever the dividends paid to the
government for these shares covered their book value (US$12 million). A bicameral
Congressional committee supervised the privatizations including the concession.  An
11-member government committee was in charge of coordinating the privatization of
OSN with representatives of most interested parties:  the Ministry of Economy and Public
Works, the Privatization Secretary, the Municipality and Province of Buenos Aires, OSN
16 In addition,  the privatization  of provincial  water  enterprises  had already  started  (in Entre  Rios).18
managers and labor unions. 17 Transparency was enhanced through the extensive use of
technical advisors, the involvement of international  agencies (IDB, UNDP, World Bank),
and by monitoring by the government office responsible for SOE audits (Sindicatura
General de Empresas Publicas).
Third, the favorable political situation described above also strengthened the
credibility of the concession, as did popular attitudes. Shortly before the concession was
signed 43 percent of the population of the Capital District and Greater Buenos Aires
favoredi  privatization of water and sewerage (Estudio Mora y Araujo, Noguera y
Asociados in field interviews 1997). This is similar to support for other privatizations
such as electricity and gas (47 percent), railways (47 percent), roads (43 percent), airlines
(41 percent) and oil (37 percent).  Since observers consulted for this study agreed that
water was not a highly salient issue for most of the city's population, investors could
reasonably expect little opposition to a reform that was billed as one that would reduce
prices, improve service and increase access.
Thus, there was little reason to doubt the short run credibility of the reform, but
the prospects that it would be sustained over the longer term were less secure. The
popularity of privatization and the extraordinary  political circumstances that made it
possible could easily change over time, as indeed they have. We consider this issue in
the next section.
7 OSN workers were members of the National Federation for Sanitary Workers and the Union for Sanitary
Workers;  in Greater Buenos Aires.19
III.  CHARACTERISTICS  OF THE BUENOS AIRES CONCESSION
The contracting literature suggests that a contract such as the Buenos Aires
concession can be expected to improve firm performance only if it: (i) reduces
information asymmetries; (ii) gives the firm incentives to comply with the contract; and
(iii) provides credible signals that the contract will be enforced and that both parties will
adhere to their commitments (see for example, Lafont and Tirole 1986, 1993; Williamson
1976, 1985; World Bank 1995; Shirley and Xu 1998, 1999). In the case of water, we are
also interested in how well the contract addresses social issues, in particular access of the
poor to water and sewerage. This section considers how the tender offer and the
concessioin  design determined the incentives, information and commitment of the
contract, and affordability of access.
A.  Information
(i) Competition  for the Market and Tender Offer. Competition is an important
mechanism to reveal information, and in that regard the Buenos Aires concession scores
relatively well. The privatization committee opted for a 30 year concession for all of
Buenos Aires, whereby a private or mixed company would assume responsibility for
operation, maintenance and investment. 18 The number of likely bidders was limited by
the size of the concession, which was one of the largest ever bid in a developing country.
As a result, the prequalification requirements limited tender offers to consortia with
8 The government chose a concession over a management contract or lease because they wanted the
private investor to take responsibility for the massive amounts of new investments needed to meet their
goals.  Sale of assets was rejected because the government did not want to delay the tender in order to
collect the information necessary to value the assets, furthermore OSN's assets were not believed to be
worth much given their poor condition (field interviews).20
experience in operating very large-scale systems.  1 9 Some consideration had been given
to dividing the concession area in two, which might have increased the number of
potential bidders as well as allowing comparative competition, but this was rejected
because it would require time and investment to separate the system.  Since the least
costly diLvision  would be between the central and suburban parts of the system, there
would be few advantages to a split. The parts would not be particularly comparable
because the suburban system would be so much less profitable and it would be harder to
attract bidders for the less profitable area.
In the event, the bid was competitive. Five consortia prequalified. 20 This was
reduced to three in the final phase of bidding because two French consortia decided to
make a joint bid and the Spanish consortium's technical proposal failed to qualify.
As discussed, the concession was awarded to the consortium that offered the
largest tariff reduction.  The winner was Aguas Argentinas, headed by Lyonnaise des
Eaux-Dumez, which offered a 26.9 percent reduction.21 This bid was followed closely by
offer of a 26.1 percent reduction from the group headed by Tharnes Water. The third bid
from North Water offered 10.1 percent.
The introduction of competition notwithstanding, a defining feature of the tender
process was poor information. The emphasis on speed, discussed above, meant that weak
'9 Specifically, the minimum requirements included more than US$ 750 million in equity, ability to borrow
at least US$ 200 million, annual revenues above US$ 600 million and experience in providing water and
sewerage services for population of at least 10 million.
20The  five prequalifying companies were: the two largest French water companies, Lyonnaise des Eaux-
Dumez and Compagnie Generale des Eaux, the British companies, Thames Water and Northwest Water, and
the Spanish state owned enterprise Canal Isabel Segunda.
21 The ownership of Aguas Argentinas was 53 percent foreign (besides the two French companies, (the
other owners were the Spanish Aguas de Barcelona and UK's Anglian Water), 37 percent Argentine
(including Sociedad Comercial del Plata, Meller, and Banco de Galicia) and 10 percent workers.  In 1994
the IFC acquired a 5 percent stake.21
and sometimes wrong information could not be improved before the auction.  Although
the government commissioned several studies, the concession contract explicitly stated
that none of the government signatories assumed any responsibility for the quality or
accuracy of the information provided.  Indeed, the winning bidder used the first four
pages of the bid document to describe the serious lack of information and the sad state of
OSN.  The fact that bids were based on such poor information suggests that the
information content of the bid was not reliable.  Bidders might have been misinformed or
assumed that they could renegotiate as new information came to light; a subject we return
t;o  later.
(ii) TariffRegime.  One striking flaw in the concession was the decision to leave
in place an inefficient and opaque tariff regime. Once again, the government actors did
not think they had the time to develop a more transparent regime.  They also feared that if
they introduced a new regime it would be hard to evaluate the tender offers and to
ascertain whether the operator was indeed implementing the agreed reduction in tariffs.
The tender regime left in place by this decision increased government and
consumer information asymmetries vis-a-vis the company. Most consumers in Buenos
Aires were and are charged a flat rate; at the time of the concession only one percent
were metered.  The unmetered tariff is set by taking the existing flat rate for the type of
consumer (iresidential,  non-residential, or real estate) and service (water only or water and
sewerage) and multiplying it by a K factor.  Thus, right after the concession was won
with a bid to reduce tariffs by 26.9 percent, the K factor was 0.731.  The resulting product
is then adjusted up or down depending on five variables: where the property is located in
Buenos Aires, the total area of the property, the square meters of the area that have22
construiction  on them, and the type of construction (six categories from low budget to
luxury) and its age. The coefficient on location has varied between 0.8 and 3.5 and the
coefficient on type of construction, between 0.6 and 2.6.22 The metered tariff is no less
complicated. It consists of a flat rate equivalent to fifty percent of the tariff that an
unmetered customer with the same characteristics would pay, plus a variable charge
calculated by multiplying the old OSN tariffs per cubic meter by K; (there is no variable
charge for the first 30 M3).
The information asymmetries inherent in the tariff regime open the way for
opportiunistic  behavior by the company. The company can change its tariff by
negotiating not only an adjustment in K, but also by reclassifying consumers from
residential to nonresidential, since non-residential pay twice as much as residential.  It
can also propose adjustments in users' lot size or building type or size, or changes in
criteria for age or location (Artana et al. 1997). In every case the company will
necessarily have better information on the revenue and consumer surplus implications of
such changes than the regulator. Another drawback to this complex formula is that it is
almost impossible for consumers to monitor their billing and protest arbitrary increases in
factors;  other than K.  On the other hand, information asymmetry might also prompt the
regulator to exercise discretion. This issue has already come up; ETOSS disallowed a
reclassification of 80,000 users from residential to nonresidential, a decision that the
company contended cost it over US$44 million over the first three years of the
concession (Nasser 1997).
22 There is also a minimum bimonthly charge of US$4 times K for residential water and sewerage and
US$8 times K for nonresidential water and sewerage.23
(iii) Regulatory Weaknesses. Information asymmetries can be reduced through
strong monitoring, but two factors worked against this in Buenos Aires:  the inexperience
of the regulator, and the poor information base on which the contract was designed.
The regulator's inexperience was natural since the agency was created quickly as
part of the general rush to privatize, and set up without a clear regulatory framework or
established procedures. Prior to the concession there was no independent regulatory
body for water; OSN as we have seen, was largely self-regulated.  There was the Sub-
secretariat of Water Resources but its responsibilities  were to develop and enforce a
natural water resources policy and coordinate  investments; there was also the Secretariat
for Natural Resources and Human Environment,  but it was in charge of environmental
regulation.23
In May 1993 ETOSS (Ente Tripartito de Obras de Servicios de Saneamiento,
Tripartite Entity for Sanitary Services) was created to regulate Aguas Argentinas and
monitor its compliance with the terms of the concession. Besides determining the tariff,
ETOSS approves and monitors the company's five-year investment plans, hears and
investigates complaints by consumers or others, and establishes penalties and corrective
measures should it find the company is out of compliance with the regulation. Not only
did the new regulatory agency have to learn on the job, it was staffed largely by former
officials of OSN who were not experienced with arms length regulation of a commercial
venture.  Furthermore.,  according to water experts in Argentina and the World Bank,
ETOSS staff is not highly qualified compared to other regulatory bodies in Argentina.
23 Until February 1998 these two entities were part of two different ministries and coordination between
them was a problem. Now both depend on the Natural Resources and Sustainable Development Secretariat
of the Office of the Presidency.24
The staff skills may not be the best for a regulator whose most important responsibility is
tariff setting; ETOSS had only four economists and four accountants versus 20 engineers
in 1995, for example (ETOSS, 1994/95).
The second problem was information. As we have seen, the tariff structure was
nontransparent and there were mistakes and gaps in information in the concession about
OSN's assets, customers, billing, etc.  This opened the door to opportunism by the firm or
the regulator.  Moreover, because the drafters did not always have enough information to
specify targets or end goals in the concession, they spelled out specific actions or projects
that Aguas Argentinas would need to implement in order to achieve the goal the
government had in mind. For example, instead of just specifying what targets the
concessionaire must meet to provide optimal service, the contract provides that "the
regulated firm must maintain and renovate all pumping materials, valves, hydrants,
connections and other elements that are needed for the optimal provision of the service,
regardless of their life span." This sort of drafting invited ETOSS to intervene unduly in
the operational decisions of a commercial company (field interviews), and, according to
some in Aguas Argentinas, empowers it to make arbitrary requests (field interviews).
B.  Incentives
(i) Investment and Other Obligations Under the Concession.  The contract set a
number of targets for the company, some of which are shown in Table 6.  Besides the
targets in the table, the contract had goals for service quality (water pressure and quality)
and metering.  These targets implied that approximately one million people would be
connected every five years for the first 15 years for a total investment cost of about
US$ 4 billion.  Investment during the first five years would amount to some US$24025
million annually compared to OSN's average annual investment of only US$  10 million
during the preceding decade.
Table 6. Performance Targets in the Buenos Aires Concession Contract
(percentages)
Year  of  Population coverage  Sewerage treatment  Network renovation  UFW*
concession  (cumulative)
Water  Sewerage  Primary  Secondary  Water  Sewerage
0  70  58  4  4  0  0  45
5  81  64  64  7  9  2  37
10  90  73  73  14  12  3  34
20  97  82  88  88  28  4  28
30  100  90  93  93  45  5  25
* UFW  is Unaccounted  for Water
SOURCE:  Aguas  Argentinas  Concession  Contract
While the contract  set significant  goals, it also lifted some obligations  from the
company.  First,  none of OSN  liabilities  were transferred  to Aguas Argentinas  except  for
an undisbursed  Inter-American  Development  Bank  loan of almost  US$100 million.2 4
Second,  before the tender the government  reduced  OSN's  work force by  1,618 through  a
voluntary  retirement  program  that cost about US$32.7  million  or about US$ 20,000  per
worker.  (During  the first year  of private operation  Aguas  Argentinas  offered  retirement
to another  2,000  employees  at a cost to the company  of US$  50 million.)
To guarantee  its performance  the contractor  had  to post an inflation  indexed
performance  bond  of US$  150 million that was forfeit  to the government  if the
24 The book  value  of the liabilities  was US$  743  million,  of which  US$  502  million  were  contingent
liabilities.  So  the value  of realized  liabilities  was  US$  241 million,  almost  half of which  were owed  to
government.26
concession were terminated for lack of performance. 25 ETOSS can also penalize the
enterprise if it fails to fulfill its commitments. The fines are substantial and escalate with
increases in water system tariffs. 26 The incentive of the company to achieve these targets
depends not only on the penalties it may face if it reneges, but also on the credibility of
the commitment it faces. The targets were considered optimistic at the outset by some
experts, who predicted the need to renegotiate the contract later.  If the company
anticipated that it could negotiate lower targets, it would not be motivated by the threat of
sanctions.  We return to this issue later.
Guarantees and penalties can be important, but ultimately a successful contract is
one that aligns the incentives of the operator with the goals of the agreement. Aguas
Argentinas has an incentive to expand service since, as we will show, it eams a return on
capital from its customers. 27 Also, under the original concession agreement, the
infrastructure fee covered part of the cost of expansion, and could only be collected by
building the network. The company also has an incentive to reduce UFW and wasteful
consumiption  since this reduces the need for costly new investments in supply.  By
eliminaiting  past liabilities and overmanning, the concession also freed Aguas Argentinas
from some of the costs of past mismanagement. The tariff regime distorted the operator's
incenti ves somewhat, however, which we consider next.
25 If the government  terminates  the contract  Aguas  Argentinas  is entitled  to its bond,  compensation  for new
assets  that  have not been  fully  depreciated  and loss of revenue  for the duration  of the contract  (based  on the
minimum  profits  in the five  years  preceding  termination).
26 Mismanagement  and failure  to provide  requested  information  and reports  are subject  to a fine  of US$
100,000.  Failure  to supply  service  or meet quality  standards  and  violations  of tariff rules are penalized  with
fines amounting  to US$  500,000.  Additionally,  delays  in the fulfillment  of agreed  five year investment
plans warrant  fines from  US$ 100,000  to US$ I million.  Any  revenues  from fines do not become  part of
ETOSS'  budget,  to avoid  giving  the agency  an incentive  to penalize  the firm in order to collect  the fine.
27  Chansges  in the law  also  enable  it to cut off service  for  nonpayment.27
(ii,) Efficiency and the TariffRegime.  Buenos Aires' tariff regime had perverse
effects on incentives as well as on information. First, the tariff embodied large cross
subsidies between customers. For example, a customer with a new luxurious home would
pay a tariff seven times larger than a customer with an older, low budget home on a
property of similar size. Large cross subsidies create an incentive for the firm to expand
services first to those consumers who will pay more. In addition, the tariff provided no
incentive to curb usage for the vast majority of customers since they pay a flat rate
regardless of volume.  As the system expands, Buenos Aires' high rates of consumption
will begin to push against the capacity of the system to supply the service. This could
motivate the company to reduce the pace of expansion if the cost of expanding supply to
meet additional demand is larger than the returns to new investment plus any anticipated
penalties for failure to comply with the contract.
The concession contract created perverse incentives for metering. Metering is
expensive, especially in Buenos Aires where the cost of a meter was estimated to be
US$200, so the cost to meter all customers would be US$300 million (Abdala 1996). It
may not be economical to meter where water supply is ample, as it is in Buenos Aires.
However, metering does make sense if metering would reduce the requirements for new
capacity, and that capacity costs more than the price to meter. Moreover when consumers
are metered, they can adjust the size of their bills by curbing consumption.
The original contract made it mandatory to meter non-residential consumers, but
left it optional for residential connections. Ninety eight percent of all connections were
classified as residential when the concession was singed in 1992; only 1 percent of
connections were metered.  Either the consumer or the company can request a meter, in28
which case a meter must be installed and whichever party made the request pays the cost.
Unlike Aguas Argentinas, most consumers are unlikely to have the infonnation to know
when metering would be advantageous for them.  Metering becomes profitable for Aguas
Argentinas when the variable charge for metered water is more than half of the fixed
charge (Abdala 1996). Since those with low fixed charges are likely to be poor, in effect
the tariff regime provides Aguas Argentinas with a incentive to meter those households
that are the least able to afford the higher water bill. 28
The procedure to adjust prices is a further instance of perverse effects on
incentives.  Buenos Aires uses a mix of price cap and cost plus pricing regulation.
Similar to a price cap, the K factor is subject to adjustment every five years, based on the
investment plan for the following five years. K can go up or down, except in the second
five-year period when prices can only be reduced. Between these periodic adjustments
prices are not inflation indexed, as is usually the case with a price cap.  Instead, whenever
a composite cost index increases by a cumulative real rate of more than 7 percent in one
year, the company can file for an equivalent increase in K.29 This index is constructed by
developing price indices for ten categories of costs, such as fuel, chemicals, electricity,
labor, debt service, etc.  Each cost category's index is based on one or more published
price indices, such as the wage index for unskilled and skilled labor in industry and
28 Abdala 1996 simulated what the unmetered and metered tariffs would be for two properties of the same
size where one is new, well located, and luxurious and the other is old, poorly located and low budget, and
assumes that the household in the more luxurious property is high income and the other is low income. In
this example, metering reduces the bill for high income households who consume less than about 125 M 3
and raises it for low income households who consume anything more than 50 M3.
29 The company or the regulator can also request price adjustments should costs go up because the
government requested changes in product quality or works, or because of changes in the tax, convertibility,
environmental or other laws that affect the company.29
consumption, which are 20 and 80 percent respectively of the cost index for labor.  The
cost categories are then assigned weights for each five-year period of the concession,
depending on their incidence in Aguas Argentinas' operating costs as estimated in the
firm's tender and five year plans.  For example, personnel costs are 39 percent of the
index and electricity is 11 percent during the first five years.  The increase is not
automatic; the request is studied by the regulator and has to be approved.
Theory tells us that price caps have an advantage over other forms of regulation:
they give the company an incentive to reduce costs in the period between price
adjustments since it can keep any additional profits.  However, it is not clear that Buenos
Aires' hybrid price system captures this advantage. The regulation reduces Aguas
Argentinas' incentive to control costs whenever the increase in the cost index nears 7
percent.  The complexity of the cost index also allows both the company and the
regulator to behave opportunistically, as was evidenced in a dispute over the size of this
cost pass-through in 1998, which we discuss in the Section V.
C  Credibility
Although political circumstances made the initial concession contract credible to
the bidders, whether credibility will be sustained as political circumstances change
depends on the mechanisms available to enforce government's adherence to the contract.
As Levy and Spiller 1994 points out, if investors fear administrative expropriation they
will limit their exposure.  For example, if Aguas Argentinas fears that its prices will not
be adjusted according to the contract or that ETOSS will act arbitrarily, it will want to
delay or reduce its investment commitments. In this section, we discuss the institutions30
that could potentially enforce the concession: regulation, legal redress, and the federal
executive's concern with Argentina's reputation in international capital markets.
(i) Enforcement by the Regulator and Judiciary. The politicization of the
regulator and the weaknesses of Argentina's judiciary made it less credible that the
goverunent  would adhere to its side of the regulatory bargain if political circumstances
changed.  The contract also provides for international  arbitration, but this is useful only as
a last resort.
Politicization was built into ETOSS' structure. It is governed by a six-member
board: two representatives of the Presidency, two of the Province of Buenos Aires and
two of i:he  Municipality of Buenos Aires; the presidency rotates between them.  Directors
are appointed for six years with the possibility of serving two terms.  Although they are
supposed to be removed only for just cause, most directors have spent no more than two
years in their positions; only two have been with the regulator since it was created in
1993. The different levels of government represented on the board have brought pressure
on the r  egulator to take politically motivated decisions. For example, in 1994 the mayor
of Buenos Aires wanted to build a highway and promised to resettle residents of a shanty
town that was in the route of the highway.  He pressured Aguas Argentinas to build the
necessary water and sewerage connections, and when the company asked for a tariff
increase to cover the cost, the ETOSS' directors representing the municipality pressured
the reg ulator for a tariff increase.  Some observers (FIEL 1996) believe that this increase
was too high and the change in responsibilities and tariff was in violation of the
concession contract.31
Not surprisingly, such a politicized board is subject to partisan disputes and
paralysis. At the time of its creation the ETOSS board was dominated by the federal
executive branch, since the presidency appointed the mayor of Buenos Aires.  The
mayor's position became directly elected in 1994 and was captured by the opposition
party.  AdLding  to the partisan divisions, the governor of the province was Menem's main
opponent within the Justicialista party. This situation raised the risks that regulatory
decisions would be based on partisan conflicts, and reduced the credibility of the
concession.
In the event of a conflict between ETOSS and Aguas Argentinas, the company
can appeal to the judiciary.  The weakness of the judiciary and its vulnerability to
political influence weaken the strength of such commitments, however. For example,
one of Menern's first initiatives as President was to increase the number of Supreme
Court judges from 5 to 9 and to appoint a large number of federal judges and state
prosecutors (de Michele and Manzetti 1996).
Sustainability 'will  be enhanced by a constitutional reform enacted a year after the
concession was signed, which will make drastic revision in utility regulation less likely.
This is because it changed electoral rules in ways that make it harder for one faction to
capture the upper house and ignore the minority (Heller and McCubbins 1998).30
However, this change will protect the company against arbitrary action by the legislature,
but not from regulatory discretion.
30  Prior to 1994, senators were elected by provincial legislatures from two-member districts by plurality
rule. When the 1994 electoral changes take effect in 2001, senators will be elected in three member districts
with the first two seats going to the party with the most votes and the third seat to the second-place party.
In the 1995 and 1998 elections, senators up for election (one third every two years) were still elected by the
provincial legislatures, but respecting the 1994 rules assuring minority representation. These rules have
created more pressure for compromise with the opposition.32
(ii) Reputation Effects.  An important factor enhancing the credibility of
government's commitment to the concession  was the concern of the Argentine
govermment  with its reputation in global financial markets.  Menem's market-oriented
reforms had made the economy open and introduced a currency board that fixed the peso
to the d[ollar. This openness to global economic influences meant that any future federal
executive would be concerned about how foreign private investors might react should-
government renege on the regulatory promises it had made to Aguas Argentinas as part of
a large and visible transaction.  Reputation can be a powerful tool for contract
enforcement, but also somewhat ephemeral. In this case, the force of reputation would
depend how salient investors perceived the concession contract to be when compared to
other reputation factors, as well as whether the firm appears to have reneged on its part of
the bargain. As we shall show in Section V, the executive branch has intervened
repeatedly to support Aguas Argentinas in conflicts with the regulator, and to bypass the
regulator entirely in renegotiating the contract.
Reputation concerns of the company, also have an effect on the sustainability of
the contract. The concession is one of the largest and its success is important to the
reputation of the consortium partners that are competing in global markets for water
contracts.  This gives them an incentive to comply with the contract even if enforcement
is weakc.  The strength of the incentive depends on the cost of compliance and whether
government appears to have reneged on its commitments.33
D. Access andAffordability
A final characteristic of the concession with important implications for
performance is affordability of access. As we have seen, the cost to expand the primary
network was shared by all users as part of Aguas Argentinas' general tariff, while the cost
of expansion of the secondary network was charged to new customers, along with the
cost of connection.  The total access charge is given in  Table 7; (to this must be added
any cost to modify household plumbing and appliances).
All consumers were required to connect to piped water and sewerage when it was
made available.  Since most of those not connected to the municipal water system relied
on wells and cesspools, we can compare these construction and operation costs with the
cost of connection. Abdala 1996 estimates that the cost to construct a well and cesspool
in 1995 (US$3,506) was considerably more than the total access charges that year
(maximum US$1,528), but for most users these costs were already sunk. The annual cost
to operate an electric pump and evacuate a cesspool (US$189) was more than the annual
cost of water and sewerage usage (US$  109). However, many of the unconnected
households were poor and probably many used hand pumps and other less expensive
forms of water and sewerage. Plus, these numbers do not include the considerable costs
to modify plumbing inside the home.34




Connection  fee  $208  $297
Infrastructure  charge  $ 43  $340
Total water  access  charge  $251  $637
Sewerage
Connection  fee  $284  $319
Infrastructure  charge  $572  $572
Total sewerage  access  charge  $856  $891
Total access  charge  $1,107  $1,528
Source:  Abdala  1996.  The charge  varied  depending  on the total  property  area (ST),  and a factor  R that
takes  into account  the type  of soil  and level of repair  needed  to streets  and sidewalks. (The  formula  is ST *
R * $0.8;25/M3.)  Abdala  1996  assumed  an average  soil  and repair  coefficient  of 1.03  and land areas  of 50
M 2 for he minimum  and  400 M 2 for  the maximum.
Affordability of the connection was a problem for poorer households.  Aguas
Argentinas was required by the concession to help new customers finance the
infrastiructure  charge. The repayment period had to be at least two years.  Although
Aguas Argentinas could have allowed a longer repayment period, it opted for two years,
which made the average monthly charge of $44.  Although the community could build
the coinection  itself, rather than pay Aguas Argentinas, consumers would still have to
cover the cost.  Some 85 percent of the unconnected consumers had low or low to middle
incomes.  Many of these were in the poorest sections of the city, where average monthly
household income was US$200 to 245 a month, such that the infrastructure charge alone
was 18 percent of their income.
Even new consumers who could afford the access charges resented the
requirement to connect, partly because they had alternative water and sewerage systems
that were now outlawed. These alternatives were risky - unconnected consumers had
higher rates of waterborne diseases because their well water was contaminated by their
cesspools - but many were not well informed about their risks and undervalued water35
quality.  As for sewerage, since it has large externalities consumers almost always place
too low a value on it (Munashinghe 1992). Another source of resentment was the fact
that customers who had been connected before the concession had not had to pay an
infrastructure fee; instead the cost of expanding the secondary network had been spread
over all customers. The infrastructure charge was a new feature introduced by the
concession. As we report below, the access fees were adjusted several times but
affordability problems combined with resentment led many customers to refuse to pay the
access charges and helped precipitate the renegotiation of the contract in 1997.
IV.  REVISIONS  AND RENEGOTIATION
Since the contract was signed, several major changes were implemented and the
concession was renegotiated. These illustrate the weaknesses inherent in the initial
design of the agreement and in the underlying institutions that supported enforcement.
(i) Revisions to Tariffs and Other Changes. The first revision occurred in 1994,
when the K factor was increased by 13.5 percent. Part of this was a 9.5 percent cost pass-
through increase because Aguas Argentinas' cost index had increased by more than 7
percent during the year. The rest was due to changes in the contract requested by the
government and agreed to by the company.3'
31 One was the increase  to cover  the municipality's  request  that  we  just described  asking  the company  to
extend  service  to a shanty  town  moved  because  of a highway  (at an estimated  cost  of US$9.8  million). A
second  change  was to accelerate  the investment  in the upgrade  of the Belgrano  water plant and  the
expansion  of the distribution  system  to 30,000  people  (US$80.4  million),  and  an acceleration  in  the
program to substitute nitrate contaminated wells with clean ones (US$3 1.8  million).  (Aguas Argentinas
failed to deliver on all of these new commitments and was fined by ETOSS, something that became an
issue in the renegotiation described below.)36
In addition, the minimum water connection fee was increased by 84 percent and
the water infrastructure fee by 38 percent, while the minimum sewerage connection fee
was increased by 42 percent and the sewerage infrastructure fee by 46 percent. These
increases aggravated the affordability and resentment problems we described earlier.
I]n  May of 1995 ETOSS decided it should modify this abrupt increase in the
access charge somewhat. The minimum connection fee for water was reduced by
16.1 percent, still far less than the earlier increase, and the maximum by 48 percent. In
addition the infrastructure fee for water was changed from a flat fee to one that varied
depending on the size and characteristics of the property. These two changes combined
to reduce the average infrastructure fee for a property of 100 M3 by 81 percent.  (One
effect of these changes was that sewerage access became substantially more costly than
water.)  In September 1995 the infrastructure fee for both water and sewerage were
reduced.  again, this time by 15 percent, when by contractual agreement the firm passed on
to consumers a drop in its labor taxes.
Notwithstanding these reductions, the infrastructure  fee combined with the
connection fee was still a problem for many poor consumers. An increasing number of
people refused to pay the fee, and Aguas Argentinas became concerned about these
growin,g  receivables, which reached US$30 million at the end of 1996. The Menem
government was also concerned because opposition politicians were exploiting the issue,
which affected one of Menem's core bases of support. The growing arrears led to the
renegol:iation  of the contract, which we consider next.
(ii) Renegotiation of the Contract. In February 1997 the company asked to
renegoitiate  the contract. Aguas Argentinas argued that its revenues after three years of37
the concession were US$217 million lower than anticipated, of which US$143 million
resulted from factors beyond the control of the company. The company also requested
suspension of fines that ETOSS had imposed because of various delays, including Aguas
Argentinas failure to meet the accelerated investment  targets agreed to as part of the 1994
tariff increase. 32 Regardless of the merit of these claims, there was clearly a problem
with the collection of the infrastructure charge, and that convinced the government that
renegotiation was necessary. The administration also wanted to use the renegotiations to
address environmental concerns, including measures to reduce contamination of the
Matanza and Riachuelo rivers.
Following the firm's request for renegotiations, ETOSS and Aguas Argentinas
presented a series of widely differing proposals. There was little ground for compromise,
and the negotiations bogged down, partly because of the political polarization of ETOSS'
board.  Ultimately, ETOSS staff were bypassed and two Federal Ministries - the Public
Works Secretariat and the Natural Resources and Human Development Secretariat -
reached an agreement directly with the company. The final agreement was passed in
August 1997 and had bipartisan approval, including by the Office of the President, a
Bicarnerial Congressional Commission and representatives of the Province and City of
Buenos Aires.
The renegotiation introduced the following main changes:
1.  Replaced the infrastructure charge to new users with a Universal Service and
Environmental Improvement Fee (SUMA) imposed on all customers. Part of the
SUMA was to cover the loss of the infrastructure charge, including past
32  By 1996,  the promised  works  on the Belgrano  treatment  plant  and  the distribution  network  were only
about 30 percent  completed,  the work  on the shanty  town  was about  60 percent  completed.38
receivables, and part would fund environmental improvements that were not
included in the original contract. Thus, in the case of water, a charge of US$2.01
was imposed to cover the cost of expanding the system to new users, and another
US$0.99 was imposed to finance the environmental improvements. The change
was required to be revenue neutral, and a methodology was specified to try to
assure this.
2.  Created a connection charge (CIS) for new users with an average value of about
US$120 for water. The CIS could be paid off in installments averaging about
US$4 every two months.
3.  Reduced Aguas Argentinas' contractual obligations by: (i) cutting expansion
targets for the first five year plan by about 15 percent for water and about
13 percent for sewerage; 33 (ii) changing the date for completion of the first plan
from the end of April to the end of December 1998; (iii) eliminating the fines
imposed by ETOSS for the failure to complete the goals of the investment
program. 34
As Table 8 shows, as a result of these changes the average bimonthly bill for
already connected residential consumers increased by 19 percent from US$37.26 to
US$44.52, while the average bill for new consumers decreased by 74 percent, from
US$60.69 to US.$15.92.
33 The fines are supposed to result in lower SUMA charges and increased investmnent  in a new
neighborhood (Puerto Madero).
34 The targets for sewerage connection in the second plan (1998-2003) were increased by 240 thousand people.39
Table 8.  Comparison of Average Bimonthly Charges
Before and After Contract Renegotiations'
Average Charges for Already  Before  After
Connected  Residential Customers
Water  and Sewerage  Services  $30.00  $30.00
Regulatory  fee (2.67%)  $0.80  $0.80
SUMA  charge  - $6.00
VAT  (2  1%)  $5.46  $7.72
TOTAL  $37.26  $44.52
Average Charge for a New Customer  Before  After
(water only)
Water  Services  $6.00  $6.00
Regulatory  fee  (2.67%)  $0.16  $0.16
SUMA  charge  --  $3.00
CIS charge  --  $4.00
Infrastructure  Charge  $44.00  --
VAT  (21%O)  $10.53  $2.76
TOTAL  $60.69  $15.92
a,/  In Argentinean Pesos (equivalent  to US$)
b/ Average monthly payment for the first two years.
SOURCE: Diario  La Naci6n 24/02/98.
The renegotiation made two fundamental changes in the nature of the concession
contract.  First, whereas under the original contract the firm received payment for
expanding the secondary network only when the work was done, the introduction of
SUMA meant that Aguas Argentinas would be paid beforehand.  This reduced the
government's leverage to assure that the works were promptly completed. At the same
time, the decision to delay the timing of planned investment without penalizing the firm
may have been a recognition that the original targets were unrealistic, but it also
established a precedent that the company would not be held accountable for delays.
Second, the regulations associated with the renegotiation shifted the tariff regime from a40
form of price cap cum cost plus, towards something more akin to rate of return
regulation. The new rules require the regulator to evaluate the impact of regulatory
changes on the company's level of indebtedness. (These criteria are currently under
review by ETOSS.)
The 19 percent increase in bimonthly bills did not excite much public comment,
perhaps because the absolute amount was small relative to the average income of
connec  ted households.  Nevertheless, various consumer associations filed suit to stop the
SUMA from going into effect,  and the Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) for Buenos
Aires also requested that the two decrees authorizing the renegotiation be annulled. The
judge initially suspended the universal service decree, but it was reinstated upon appeal
by the Natural Resources and Human Development Secretariat, the government of the
Province of Buenos Aires and a group of 16 mayors of those districts where expansion
works were planned.
More recent tariff changes did excite public opposition, however, since they came
on top of the earlier increases and at a time when economic growth was slowing.  In 1998
Aguas Argentinas requested an 11.7 percent cost pass-through increase, since its cost
index had gone up by more than 7 percent. The proposed hike stimulated strenuous
opposition from the two ETOSS directors appointed by the Mayor of Buenos Aires,
whose constituency had been the most affected by the SUMA. The ETOSS board voted
on the increases cost by cost instead of on the entire cost index, and granted only a 1.6
percent increase. The two Buenos Aires directors voted against any increase. The
Federal Executive Branch again intervened:  the Secretary of Natural Resources granted41
Aguas Argentinas another 3 percent on top of the 1.6 percent awarded by ETOSS, for a
total of 4.6 percent, still less than the 11.7 originally requested.
The adjustments and renegotiation contributed to a highly partisan debate in the
press and some public disillusionment with the concession. 35 Some commentators (FIEL,
Delfino) argue that the adjustments show the company acted opportunistically from the
beginning, underbidding and accepting patently unreliable information in the expectation
that tariffs would be renegotiated later. The fact that Aguas Argentinas signed a loan
agreement with IFC in 1994 that required it to meet a debt to net worth ratio that it could
only achieve if prices were increased or its investment targets reduced, seems to suggest
an expectation of renegotiation. 36 If this is true, than at least one other bidder would have
had to be equally strategic, since the second offer from the consortium headed by Tharnes
Water was so close to the winning bid (26.1 percent versus 26.9 percent). Regardless of
the truth of this assertion, the subsequent adjustments of the contract illustrate the risks of
auctioning and regulating with such poor information, the problems inherent in a
politicized regulator and weak judiciary, and the difficulty of winning public trust under
such circumstances.
V.  EFFECTS  ON PERFORMANCE  AND WELFARE
Notwithstanding the flaws in the concession and the institutional weaknesses we
have described above, the concession led to major gains in performance and in consumer
35 Public support for privatization in general has decreased from 38 -39 percent in 1990-91 to 16-18 percent
in 1996-97. Centros de Estudios Union parra la Nueve Mayoria. This opposition is due to a sense that
privatized enterprises are reaping profits at public expense because of weak regulation. Field interview
with Manuel Mora y Araujo, public opinion expert, February 1998.
36 Based on assumption that all profits are fully reinvested; see Abdala 1996.42
welfare. Furthermore, the revisions and renegotiation did not have substantial negative
effects on these achievements.
(i) The Effects of the Reform on Performance. The most dramatic effect of the
concession was the increase in investment (Figure 2).  Aguas Argentinas estimated that to
achieve the original targets under the (pre-renegotiation) concession  for the first five-year
period it would have to invest US$1.2 billion. Actual investment was less, about
US$1.05 billion from 1993 to 1997. As a result of this investment new connections
increased by 11 percent over the five years and coverage increased from 70 percent of
customers in the service area in 1992 to 83 percent by 1997 (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Water Coverage
(%  of Population  in Service  Area with  Connections)
100%
640%.  . - - - - - - - - --  ---  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---  - - - - - - - - -- - -- --  - - - - - - -
0%
1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
This new investment was financed largely through internal funds and debt
(Figure 4).  In contrast to OSN, which had been allowed to borrow only twice from 1980
to 1993, Aguas Argentinas raised its debt:equity ratio from 1.17 in 1993 to 2.37 in 1996
by issuing short term commercial paper and long term borrowing from IFC (0.38 in 1992).
Figure 4. Aguas Argentinas: Sources of Funds
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Internal savings were an important source of capital thanks to the fact that
operating revenues expanded despite the initial price reduction. Prior to 1997, most of
the increase in operating revenues was due to improved billing and collection.  Judging44
from changes in accounts receivable, collections went from 90 percent of amount billed
in 1992 to 97.8 percent in 1993, then dropped to 94.4 percent by 1997.
Overall trends in real consumer prices for water services are hard to judge
because the initial drop in the K-factor was partly offset by changes in access fees, the
introduction of SUMA and the reclassifications of consumers to higher rate categories.
The trend in real operating revenues per cubic meter of water delivered to the consumer
(i.e., minus UFW), is shown in Figure 5, suggests that unit prices have risen since the
initial drop, but are not yet back to 1992 levels.  Controversy has arisen over Aguas
Argentinas' prices because some observers, adding up revenue neutral increases and
increases due to cost inflation, have concluded that the company bid strategically with a
plan to increase prices later. However, taking into account all adjustments since 1992
including SUMA, an already connected customer was paying about 23.4 percent more for
water services in 1998 than in 1992; during that same period the consumer price index
increased by 21.2 percent.
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The margin of profits to sales has increased (Figure 6) but is not exceptionally
high.  Unfortunately return on assets is hard to calculate since the company does not own45
most of the assets of the system. Estimates which estimate fictional assets, including
assets owned by the government but operated by the firm, suggest a return on assets of
about 3 percent in 1998.
Figure 6.  Net Profit Margin
(Net Income before nonrecurring Items /Net Sales)
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The increase in operating profits and in the generation of internal savings for
investment were largely a result of reductions in Aguas Argentinas' operating costs,
which fell by more than 14 percent in real terms from 1992 to 1998. This decline was
partly due to a sharp reduction in labor costs thanks to the retirement programs described
earlier. The number of employees went from 7,666 in 1992 to 3,829 by 1996, then rose
to 4,494 by 1998, which brought labor per thousand connections down from 3.3 to 1.5
and back to 1.7 by 1998, similar to other efficient companies such as EMOS in Santiago
or Thames Water in the United Kingdom. The real cost of intermediate inputs also fell as
the company improved its use of chemical products for water treatment and brought
down its real electricity prices by bargaining for a term contract as a large customer in
Argentina's wholesale electricity market.  At the same time, production of water
increased only moderately, to 1.4 billion cubic meters a year, or a total of 4 percent from
1992 to 1998. UFW was curtailed, from 0.44 in 1992 to 0.34 by 1998 (Figure 7).46
However, consumption of water by final users continued be high and metering remained
low, increasing from 1 percent before the concession  to 12 percent by 1998.
Figure 7.  Unaccounted for Water
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As a result of these changes and the increases in revenues,  operating expenses dropped
from about 99 percent of operating revenues in 1992 to 61 percent by 1998. Again this is
not much higher than other low cost systems, such as EMOS in Santiago where the ratio
was 47 percent in 1997, or Thames Water in London (58 percent), and even more
remarkable given the massive rehabilitation program. Total factor productivity also
increased dramatically the first three years of the concession (Figure 8).
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Service quality also improved markedly after the concession, see Table 9.
Although the number of complaints increased this was probably because channels of
communication improved. Response time to complaints dropped sharply despite the
larger number. And water pressure, which was always good in the Federal District,
improved in Greater Buenos Aires as well.
Table 9.  Service Indicators
Before  After
Concession(1992)  Concession (1995)
Water complaints (no.)  43,800  143,739
Response time (hr.)  144  48
Sewerage complaints (no.)  99,400  164,911
Response time (hr.)  240  30
Customers with pressure  17%2  54%3
>8wcm (%) Greater BA'
'wcm = water column  meters  where 10  wcm = I atmosphere.  2May,  1993.  3April  1996.
Source:  ETOSS  and Aguas  Argentinas.
(ii) Welfare Effects  of the Concession.  We measured the welfare effects of the
concession by comparing the performance of Aguas Argentinas after the concession with
what the expected performance would have been had the company not been privatized.
To do this we projected the flows generated by the firm to the different parties involved -
consumers, workers, government, buyers - and compared them with the counterfactual
flows under continued public ownership. The methodology is based on Jones, Tandon
and Vogelsang 1990 and details on the analysis can be found in Abdala 1996. The data
cover 1987 to 1998. We use the period of actual public operation to construct a
counterfactual public Aguas Argentinas and project its operation for ten years after
privatization to 2002, and the actual private operation to project the private Aguas48
Argentinas to the same year. 37 We assumed that Aguas Argentinas would fulfill the
terms of the concession with some exceptions;  we incorporated the changes introduced
by the 1997 renegotiation in our calculations. 38 Thus, the actual and projected years are
the following:
L1987  ......  1993  ...............  1998..................2002
Actual public  Counterfactual  Projected public
Actual private  Projected private
WELFARE CALCLUATION PERIOD
To construct the counterfactual we made three assumptions about the effects of
the concession. First we assumed that the concession removed an investment constraint.
Thus, if OSN had not been privatized, we assume that investment would have risen only
enough to permit connections to expand at the same low rate observed during the actual
period cf public operation - about 1.5 percent a year in both water and sewerage. This
assumption seems reasonable since the Menem government's policy was not to prop up
investment in SOEs that were not being privatized. Indeed, following the 1994 so-called
Tequila crisis, resources for public investment projects were cut.  For example, funds for
the Yacyreta hydroelectric project were cut from $300 million to $66 million in 1996 and
to zero thereafter. A lower rate of increase in its customer base would result in less
revenues for the counterfactual company than Aguas Argentinas captured, and we
therefore assume it would not have had funds to reduce UFW or increase metering. The
counterfactual company would also have had less funds than Aguas Argentinas to
37 Of course there would be gains beyond this period but they would be reduced by discounting.
38 Our assumption is that Aguas Argentinas would not have met the investment targets even if the
renegotiation had not occurred.  We made this assumption  because the company could not meet the targets
without violating its loan agreement with the IFC that the debt:equity ratio would be less than 1.9 from
1998 onwards.49
improve service and product quality, and collection rates would have been lower because
of lower irnvestments  in information systems and management.
Second, we assumed that much of the gains in labor productivity and intermediate
inputs would not have occurred without the concession. Instead, we assume that the
counterfactual company would continue OSN's historic trend in labor productivity,
which improved by an annual rate of 6.5 percent a year from 1987 to 1992, largely
through attrition. Aguas Argentina's retirement program would have been difficult for
OSN to finance in the absence of a serious reform program and might not have been
credible to workers without privatization. Aguas Argentinas' real reductions in operating
expenses were not likely to have occurred without privatization either.  OSN had shown
ino  efforts to minimize input purchases and it seems unlikely that this would have
changed.
Finally, we assumed that the reduction in prices in 1993 would not have occurred
'without the auction of the concession, and therefore, the counterfactual's nominal prices
would have remained the same. Other state enterprises in Argentina did not change
prices in the absence of privatization.  Moreover, nominal prices would not have
increased since the Convertibility Law fixing the parity between the peso and the dollar
prohibited indexation clauses, nor would prices have gone down since that would trigger
the need for funds from the Treasury to finance the company's operating deficit.
Average prices between the counterfactual and the actual scenarios differ for other
reasons as well. As we have seen the net effect of the SUMA was to raise prices for
some consumers.  In addition, Aguas Argentinas was able to reclassify about 11 percent
of residential customers who should have been charged as non-residential (still not as50
many as the company wanted, as we have seen), and to meter some customers. The
company's photographic and on-site inspections also enabled it to correct the reported
size of built areas, which led to increases for some 425,000 customers.
Table 10 shows that the welfare gains from the concession over continued public
operation total US$1.16 billion.  Since these gains are the next present value of a flow in
perpetuity, the final column of the table expresses the annual equivalent of the net
welfare gains as a percent of OSN's sales revenue in the last year before sale. The big
winners are consumers, with eighty percent of the increased gains; 79 percent of the gains
are reaped by domestic actors.
Table 10. Welfare Effects from Concession
1992 USS Millions
NPV (US$M)  92 Output  Anual Welfare per Group
GOVERNMENT  (137.97)  -4.60%
DOMESTIC  66.76  2.23%
INVESTORS
FOREIGN  349.60  11.66%
INVESTORS
WORKERS  49.52  1.65%  $11,602 /Employee ($US)
COMPETITORS  2.27  0.08%
CONSUMERS  1,326.58  44.25%  $519.13/Connection $US)
TOTAL DOMESTIC  1,656.77  55.27%  S 75M801  Per capita ($US)
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on ETOSS  and  Aguas  Argentinas  data (see  Abdala  1997).
Government loses slightly as a result of the concession. Although Treasury gets
more in taxes, we must deduct from that the levy governrment  collects to pay ETOSS'
costs.  Government receives fewer quasi-rents as a shareholder of Aguas Argentinas than
as the owner of OSN, plus it has to pay for the transaction and OSN's debts.
Employees do better because they own 10 percent of Aguas Argentinas' shares.
We assumed that workers who took voluntary retirement did so because the payments51
were sufficient compensation for being laid off.  Buyers are better off by US$416 million,
thanks to the quasi rents they earn on their investment in the company. Competitors in
the effluent business lose slightly because Aguas Argentinas takes some of their market.
Consumers are the big winners, better off by almost US$ 1.33 billion.  The gain in
consumer surplus is calculated using a demand elasticity based on studies of willingness-
to-pay in similar cities. 39 This is a conservative estimate of their gains since it does not
take into account improvements in product and service quality or the effects of improved
public health and reduction of sewerage overflows. It does take into account the benefits
from reduced interruptions.
The gain in consumer surplus disproportionately benefited high and middle-
income users. A large part of this welfare gain results from the drop in tariffs following
the concession tender, despite subsequent tariff increases prior to the renegotiation. Most
of this gain accrued to predominately higher income consumers who were already
connected at the time of the concession. The other major source of gains in consumer
surplus is reduced rationing of demand thanks to Aguas Argentinas' higher pace of
building new connections.  As we saw in Table 5, almost two thirds of the expected
beneficiaries from new connections were lower middle to upper income. Moreover, as
we have seen the infrastructure charge proved unaffordable for the very poor.  In addition
during the first two years after privatization  the company did not try to reach low-income
households.  Hence, it seems likely that the percentage of new connections going to poor
households, at least until 1998, was lower than the 36 percent that Table 5 suggests.
39 See Abdala 1997. The elasticity in the base case was -0.35 for residential users and -0.85  for non-
residential.52
We tested the sensitivity of the results to our assumptions about rationing policy,
elasticity of demand, prices, discount rate, investment costs, labor productivity and the
like.  Changes in most of these parameters had little impact, so we focused on the few
that did (Table 11). The direction of the results are robust to these changes which only
have an effect on magnitudes.  The most important effect on consumer welfare comes if
we change the rationing policy. We assumed that demand is rationed by willingness-to-
pay.  If instead demand is rationed randomly, than the gains to consumers would be much
less.  Random rationing, however, is not a realistic assumption given what we know
about the city.  Clearly people with connections or getting connections first were
wealthier than those without connections which suggests that rationing was by
willingness-to-pay.
We also tested changes from our basic assumptions of +/- 0.25 in elasticity for
residential and non-residential consumers. As we would expect a lower residential price
elasticity raises consumer surplus substantially.
Gains to investors are most sensitive to changes in output prices and dividend pay
out ratios. If prices increase by 1 percent a year in real terms, buyers are slightly better
off (by about US$ 10 million) and consumers are slightly worse off (by about US$ 30
million). If 100 percent of dividends are paid off, buyers' gains are almost tripled, while
government is worse off.
We also compared the gains to what they would have been had the 1997
renegotiation not occurred. The effect was negligible.  While the SUMA reduced
consumer surplus for those already connected it raised it for new customers, so the net
effect was slight.  The reduction in Aguas Argentinas' investment targets does not cause53
much difference, since we already had assumed that the company would have to curtail
investment to meet the conditions of the IFC loan. We also tested the effects of lifting
the constraints on Aguas Argentinas' investment, but the gains in consumer surplus are
too small to offset the loss to shareholders  and the net effect on welfare is negative.
Table 11. Sensitivity Analysis
GOVERNMENT  DOM.INVESTORS  WORKERS  CONSUMERS  TOTAL DOMESTIC
NPV  92 Output WV  (US$M) 92 Output  NPV  92 Output  NPV  92 Output  NPV (USSM)  92 Output
(USSM)  %  %  (USSM)  %  (USSM)  %  %
Base  (138)  -4.60%  67  2.23%  50  1.65%  1,327  44%  1,657  55%
Random Rationing  (138)  -4.60%  67  2.23%  50  1.65%  604  20%  934  31%
Residential  (138)  4.60%  67  2.23%  50  1.65%  1,207  40%  1,537  51%
Elasticity -0.6
Residential  (138)  4.60%  67  2.23%  50  1.65%  2,045  68%  2,376  79%
Elasticity -0.1
Non-Res.  (138)  4.60%  67  2.23%  50  1.65%  1,226  41%  1,556  52%
Elasticity 0.95
Non-Res.  (138)  4.60%  67  2.23%  50  1.65%  1,454  49%  1,784  60%
Elasticity 0.75
Proy.Annual Price  (127)  4.23%  77  2.56%  56  1.86%  1,297  43%  1,702  57%
Incr. 1%
Proy.Dividend  (183)  -6.11%  191  6.36%  128  4.27%  1,327  44%|  2,396  80%
Payout  100%
VI.  CONCLUSION
This paper finds that the Buenos Aires water system concession had large benefits
for consumer welfare, along with smaller gains for buyers and employees. Performance
improved dramatically.  The average annual investment of Aguas Argentinas in the first
six years of the concession was 2.4 times that of OSN in the last decade of its operation,
its operating efficiency improved markedly, and product and service quality were much
higher. There were also important social and external benefits from the increase in
coverage.  Some 1.46 million people who now have access to piped water and 583
thousand with access to sewerage will no longer be consuming contaminated well water
or polluting groundwater or rivers.54
What features of the concession account for these gains? First was competition.
Despite the flaws in information, the competitive auction of the contract produced a
major price reduction and made it clear that the market was contestable. Second was
appropriate alignment of incentives. The company's revenues increase when access
expands, since average prices allow the company to cover the cost of service and earn a
return on its investment, plus the company can be penalized if it fails to meet its targets.
The strength of the incentive has been diminished somewhat with the introduction of
SUMA and the credibility of regulatory penalties was reduced when ETOSS fines were
waved during the 1997 renegotiation. The company also has an incentive to curb UFW
and wasteful consumption, since this reduces the amount it must invest in new
production.  Third, the currency board, the privatization program more broadly and the
general openness of Argentina's economy gave the concession credibility with investors.
Even though it is not unusual for an economic crisis and sector problems to bring
about circumstances where efficient change is possible, the political circumstances that
made the concession politically feasible, politically desirable and credible in Argentina
are not common.  Radical changes are atypical in democracies, and it is unusual for an
administration to exploit the opportunity for consensus as effectively as the Menem
government did.  It is very rare for water to have such a low cost that government can
attract an investor to reverse years of disinvestment and neglect - and also offer a lower
consumer tariff.  Low cost raw water was not the only reason this was possible.  It was
also important that the concession was credible to private investors, thanks to the
government's prior history of privatization, the transparent auction and broad base of
support built through the privatization process, and favorable public attitudes.55
The sustainability of the concession was and is less secure, however.  Although
the 1994 constitutional change will make it harder to overturn the concession in
Congress, the weakness of the regulatory framework has put sustainability in doubt.
ETOSS is vulnerable to politically motivated interventions in its decisions, as evidenced
by the 1998 price decision, and can be paralyzed by partisan disputes in its board, as
during the renegotiation of the contract. It suffers from serious information asymmetries
created by poor historical data and the newness and weakness of its staff.  The provision
for cost pass through when Aguas Argentinas' cost go up by more than 7 percent adds to
ETOSS' information burden, since it is ambiguous and requires more judgment than a
simple inflation adjustment. The lack of metering and the obscure nature of the tariff
formula also make it harder for the regulator to judge the revenue effects of price
increases. It gives the company an incentive to negotiate individual tariff components,
such as the classification of users or the location coefficient, rather than just the K factor,
further complicating the regulator's task.
ETOSS' weakness feeds consumer doubts that their interests are not being
protected, and that in turn increases political pressures to renege on agreed price
increases. The lumpy nature of the cost plus increases adds to consumer concerns.  The
poor information base, lack of transparency in regulatory decisions and ad hoc nature of
executive branch interventions make it harder to reassure consumers that their welfare is
being protected.
Taking more time to get information on the system and rationalize the pricing
policy could have reduced many of these problems. However, it is hard to know whether
delay would have ultimately halted the concession, as the administration feared.  Delays56
in other cities, such as Lima, Mexico City, Santiago, ending up derailing planed
privatization of the water system.
The concession agreement states that the operator assumes the information risks
and that "claims based on defects of information provided will not be allowed."  Yet
Aguas Argentinas' claim for redress of costs beyond its control stated that about half
these costs were due to wrong information from OSN. Nasser, FIEL and other observers
have argued that the winning bid was aggressive given the poor information base,
suggesting that the company was assuming that it could shift the burden of the
information risk to the government. However, the second bid was very close to the
winning bid, which suggests that more than one party was acting aggressively, possibly
in response to some reasonable expectation that renegotiation would be feasible. The
company was also responsible for collecting all usage and access fees under the contract,
another risk that was lifted during negotiation. Here again, part of the problem was lack
of information--in this case, the government's lack of information on affordability.
There are several lessons from the Aguas Argentinas' concession. First the
experience reinforces conventional wisdom that risks and responsibilities, as well as the
grounds for renegotiation, should be spelled out as clearly as possible in the contract. It
also suggests that contracts that shift all information risk to bidders may not be credible.
Second, safeguards are needed to reduce the risk of regulatory capture by the
company or politicians.  One such safeguard is to reduce regulatory discretion by
enshrining in law less ad hoc procedures for setting tariffs. Since the 1994 constitutional
change made laws harder to reverse in Argentina, detailing tariff regulations in the law
would likely enhance regulatory stability, as it has in Chile. It might also reduce57
consumer opposition. Experience in other countries suggests that consumers are more
likely to react to tariff increases that seem unfair or unjustified than to high tariffs per se.
Cities such as Santiago, for example, have higher tariffs and lower per capita incomes
than Buenos Aires' yet there have been no protests when water tariffs were increased for
the private and public operators. 40 This is partly because the laws detail a technical
process that occurs automatically no more than once every five years, with inflation
adjustments in the interim. The cost: plus provision in the Buenos Aires concession
makes interim tariff increases ad hoc and lumpy. We have argued that these increases,
the additional tariff adjustments to cover new tasks and the renegotiation and the
perceived weakness of the regulator have contributed to the public's sense of being
poorly protected from arbitrary change, and this increases the risk of politically motivated
manipulation of price policy.
Transparent, rule-based decision making, such as that used in Santiago, for
example, is important to maintaining public confidence in regulated industries.  Ad hoc
intervention by the federal executive in regulatory decisions is inconsistent with rule
based regulation, which can only be overturned by a pre-established process of appeal.
Another safeguard against political intervention is to avoid a politicized board;
ETOSS' board currently pits partisan interests against one another, and allows short term,
sectarian interests to control decision making. ETOSS' board could be replaced or
enlarged with technical appointees (such as economists and hydraulic engineers) to
reduce the dominance of political appointees. U.S. experience suggests that better public
40 Although  most of Santiago  is served  by a public  company,  about five  percent  of consumers  are served  by
a privately  owned  water  company. Santiago's  means  tested  subsidy  for water services  also  reduces
opposition  to increases.58
information on regulatory decisions and an open public comment period would also
protect against capture by narrow political interest or by the regulated company.
Third, the Buenos Aires experience raises questions about the practice of bidding
on the basis of consumer price in systems where there are large benefits from expanded
coverage, and those without access are poor. The concession could have been bid on the
basis of the cost of access, in order to maximize new connections.  The welfare gains of
already connected consumers would have been lower, but the gains to newly connected
households and from reduced health externalities  would have been greater than they
were, along with much more equitable redistributive effects. As it was, the price
reduction was based on unrealistic assumptions about the willingness and ability of poor
new consumers to pay large fees for access. The introduction of SUMA has created
another unsustainable contract. By virtually eliminating the incentive of the company to
expand services to the poor (who pay below marginal cost), SUMA opens the way for
future problems. Buenos Aires' experience suggests that the poor benefit more from
subsidized financing for access than from subsidized usage charges, which benefit the
rich disproportionately.
Finally, the Aguas Argentinas experience suggests that the information benefits
from metering need to be considered more carefully in designing regulatory policy.
Typically, the cost of metering is measured against the benefits of reduced consumption,
which may be low in a system where raw water is cheap and capacity is not constrained,
as in Buenos Aires. But metering also reduces the information burden for regulators and
makes it possible for consumers to monitor billing and reduce their bills by controlling
consumption and these benefits, albeit intangible, may be high in weak regulatory
settings.59
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